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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The fol lowing i s s u e s are presented in t h i s appeal: 
1. Is the evidence insuff icient to support the 
judgment of forfeiture? 
2. Did the tr ia l court abuse i t s discretion in 
forfeit ing the motorcycle and denying defendant's motions to 
suppress and dismiss? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 860206 
v. : 
ONE 1982 SILVER HONDA MOTOR- : Category No. 13b 
CYLE, Utah Registration 5P218, 
VIN IHFSCO229CA235970, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Verd Erickson, owner of defendant 1982 silver Honda 
motorcycle, was charged by information with three counts of 
unlawful distribution for value of a controlled substance, a 
Becond degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
(Supp. 1985), of which he was convicted. State v. Erickson, 722 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1986). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 
(1953, as amended) defendant 1982 silver Honda motorcycle was 
forfeited (R. 72X-72Y). 
All statutory references are to Utah Code Ann., 1953 as 
amended, unless otherwise indicated. Appellant is hereafter 
referred to as defendant motorcycle. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although there were minor conflicts in the testimony 
received at trial, the following facts are, for the most part, 
undisputed. 
Having received information that Verd Erickson 
(Erickson), a dentist who had an office in Taylorsville, Utah, 
was over-prescribing and illegally distributing drugs to his 
patients, the Metro Narcotics Strike Force arranged to have an 
undercover officer, Celeste Paquette (Paquette), meet with 
Erickson at his dental office (R. 136-37). It was decided that 
two additional officers, Alex Huggard (Huggard) and Foster Mayo 
(Mayo), would hold surveillance at Erickson's dental office and 
monitor discussions between Paquette and Erickson by means of a 
•wire" carried by Paquette (R. 192, 213, 214-15, 235-36, 239, 
267). The "wire" transmitted her conversations with Erickson to 
her fellow narcotics officers who were outside with receiving and 
recording equipment (R. 214-15, 235-36). 
On the morning of May 24, 1985, Paquette, using the 
name Kris Gordon, arrived at Erickson's dental office with a 
friend of hers for a dental appointment which had been scheduled 
the day before (R. 127). Once seated in the dental chair, 
Paquette informed Erickson that she did not have a problem with 
her teeth, but was concerned about the effects her ingestion of 
•speed" (amphetamines) was having on them (R. 138-39). Erickson 
told her that he would have to examine her teeth before 
discussing the matter (R. 139). After the examination, Paquette 
again asked Erickson about the possible problem created by 
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amphetamines (R. 139) . He responded that amphetamines purchased 
from a pharmacist would be l e s s harmful than those purchased on 
the s t r e e t and that she should f ind a doctor who would wri te a 
prescr ipt ion for amphetamines for her (R. 140) . When Paquette 
indicated that she knew of no one who would wr i te prescr ipt ions 
for her, Erickson to ld her he could, but he d i s l i k e d writ ing 
prescr ipt ions because they l e f t a "paper t r a i l " (R. 140) . 
Erickson then said he would write her a prescr ipt ion and asked 
her to return to the o f f i c e at 5:00 p.m. when i t was closed (R. 
141) . 
Upon her return to Erickson's o f f i c e at 5:00 p.m. that 
same day, Paquette was asked by Er i ckson^ recept ion i s t to come 
back at 6:00 p.m. (R. 141) . At 6:00 p.m., Paquette met with 
Erickson who asked what she wanted in the l i n e of prescr ipt ions 
(R. 142) . Paquette said she was looking for amphetamines and 
dexedrine (R. 142) . Erickson said he d idn' t want t o write a 
prescr ipt ion because that was more dangerous (R. 142) . Erickson 
asked Paquette to wait a minute. Standing in the waiting room 
and looking through the b l inds , Paquette observed him go outs ide 
to defendant motorcycle parked in front of h i s o f f i c e and watched 
him take something out of the saddlebag portion of defendant 
motorcycle (R. 142, 258, 2 8 3 ) . ! When Erickson returned he had a 
small prescr ipt ion b o t t l e (R. 142) . He dumped the contents of 
the prescr ipt ion b o t t l e in to h i s hands (R. 142) . The b o t t l e 
1 There i s no dispute that the defendant motorcycle belongs t o 
Erickson and i s the subject of the act ion which i s on appeal (R. 
92 , 322) . There i s a l s o no dispute that the estimated value of 
the defendant motorcycle was $8,200 (R. 328) . 
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contained some yellow tablets and three black capsules, some of 
which were later identified as amphetamines by the state crime 
lab (R. 142, 258). After stating that he wanted street value for 
the drugs, which he identified as biphetamines and amphetamines, 
Erickson exchanged the drugs for sixty dollars in cash that 
Paquette offered (R. 143, 257). 
During the time Paquette was in Erickson1s dental 
office, Officers Huggard and Mayo were monitoring discussions 
between Paquette and Erickson and observing the front of the 
dental office where Erickson's motorcycle was parked (R. 143, 
191, 193, 216, 238). Shortly after 6:00 p.m., while Paquette was 
in Erickson1s office, Huggard and Mayo observed a male, who was 
later identified as Erickson, exit the dental office, walk to 
defendant motorcycle parked immediately in front of the dental 
office, go to the back of defendant motorcycle, open a suitcase-
like compartment or saddlebag, take a package or some small item 
out of it, close the compartment, and then walk back inside the 
dental office (R. 193, 194, 207, 208-09, 215-16, 239-41). They 
watched as Paquette left the office and Erickson followed, he 
locked the front door, went to the motorcycle, stood there a 
minute or so, got on the motorcycle and drove off (R. 198, 241). 
As previously arranged, one week later on May 31st 
Paquette again met Erickson at his dental office (R. 143, 261-
62). Erickson asked her how she liked the pills she had received 
the previous week, and then freely discussed a sale of a large 
quantity of amphetamines and a small amount of "Demerol" 
(meperidine) to her for $5,000.00 (R. 261-62). The two agreed to 
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make the transaction for the amphetamines and Demerol three days 
later on June 3rd under the pretense that Paquette would be 
coming into the office to have her teeth cleaned (R. 262-63). On 
the morning of June 3rd, after cleaning Paquette1s teeth, 
Erickson told her to return at 6:00 p.m. to discuss the deal (R. 
263). When Paquette returned at that time, Erickson exchanged 
the amphetamines and Demerol for $5,000.00 in cash that she had 
in an envelope (R. 263-64). Immediately thereafter, 
approximately eight narcotics officers entered Erickson1s dental 
office and arrested him (R. 157-59, 195, 220-221, 264). 
After Erickson's arrest, defendant motorcycle, which 
was parked in front of the dental office, was impounded (R. 183, 
231). 
At t r i a l below, Erickson admitted a l l of the f a c t s and 
a l l e g a t i o n s , except going out to the defendant motorcycle to get 
the amphetamines (R. 333) . 
Erickson was charged under § 58-37-8(1) ( a ) ( i i ) with 
unlawful d i s t r i b u t i o n for value of a contro l led substance, a jury 
found him g u i l t y as charged, and the convict ion was affirmed on 
appeal by t h i s Court. S ta te v« Erickson t 722 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1986) . 
SUMMARY PF_ ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at t r i a l was s u f f i c i e n t to 
support the court ' s judgment of f o r f e i t u r e . 
The t r i a l court did not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
f o r f e i t i n g the motorcycle and denying defendant's motions to 
suppress and dismiss . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE. 
Defendant motorcycle argues that the State presented 
i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence at t r i a l to support the judgment of 
f o r f e i t u r e . When considering a chal lenge to the su f f i c i ency of 
the evidence, t h i s Court has applied the fol lowing standard of 
review: 
This Court w i l l not l i g h t l y overturn the 
f indings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at t r i a l in 
the l i g h t most favorable to the j u r y ' s 
v e r d i c t , and w i l l only in t er f ere when 
the evidence i s so lacking and insubstan-
t i a l that a reasonable man could not pos-
s ib ly have reached a verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt. We a l s o view in a 
l i g h t most favorable to the j u r y ' s verd ic t 
those f a c t s which can be reasonably i n -
ferred from evidence presented to i t . 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) ( c i t a t i o n s 
omit ted); S ta te v. N ick l e s , 43 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (10 /7 /86 ) . As 
noted in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conv ic t ion , we do not 
s u b s t i t u t e our judgment for that of the 
jury. "It i s the e x c l u s i v e function of 
the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t -
n e s s e s . . . . " State v. Lammy Utah, 
606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord Sta te 
v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 
(1983). So long as there i s some e v i -
dence, including reasonable in ferences , 
from which f indings of a l l the r e q u i s i t e 
elements of the crime can reasonably be 
made, our inquiry s tops . 
Id. at 345 ( c i t a t i o n omit ted) . And, even i f the Court views the 
evidence as l e s s than wholly conc lus ive , or i f contrary evidence 
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or c o n f l i c t i n g inferences e x i s t , the verdict should be upheld. 
S tate v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 , 97 (Utah 1982), In short , "on 
c o n f l i c t i n g evidence the Court i s obl iged t o accept the vers ion 
of the f a c t s which support the verd ic t ." State v. Isaacson, 704 
P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) , c i t i n g State v. Howell, 649 P.2d at 
^3, Circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to e s t a b l i s h 
the g u i l t of the accused. State v. Clayton, 646 P. 2d 723, 725 
(Utah 1982). F ina l ly , defendant must show that the evidence was 
so insubstant ia l or i n c l u s i v e that reasonable minds must have 
entertained s u f f i c i e n t doubt. S tate v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142 (Utah 
1983) . 
Verd Erickson, owner of defendant 1983 s i l v e r Honda 
motorcycle, was charged with unlawful d i s t r i b u t i o n for value of a 
control led substance after s e l l i n g amphetamines and Demerol to an 
undercover narcot ics o f f i cer (Paquette) on May 24 and June 3 , 
1985 (R. 143 , 157-59, 195, 220-21 , 257, 263, 264) . On May 24r 
Paquette twice went to Erickson1s dental o f f i c e while two other 
o f f i c e r s monitored by •wire" the d i scuss ions between Paquette and 
Erickson and watched the front o f f i c e from a car outs ide (R. 127, 
141 , 142, 143 , 191 , 193 , 216, 238) . Erickson's s i l v e r 1983 Honda 
motorcycle was parked in front of the o f f i c e in p la in view of the 
o f f i c e r s (R. 92 , 142, 258, 283, 322) . During a d iscuss ion with 
Paquette concerning "speed" and amphetamines, Erickson s tated 
that she should f ind a doctor who would wri te a prescr ipt ion for 
amphetamines for her (R. 138-40) . When she indicated that she 
knew of no one who would wri te prescr ipt ions for her, Erickson 
to ld her he could, but d i s l i k e d writ ing prescr ipt ions because 
• 7 -
they l e f t a "paper t r a i l " (R. 140 ) . However, Erickson said he 
would write her a prescr ipt ion and asked her to return at 5:00 
p.m. when the o f f i c e c losed (R. 141) . When she returned a t 5:00 
p.m., Erickson's r e c e p t i o n i s t asked her to come back at 6:00 p.m. 
(R. 1 4 1 ) . At 6:00 p. m. , Paquette met with Erickson t o d i scuss 
drugs (R. 142) . After Paquette said she was looking for 
amphetamines and dexidrine , Erickson said he d idn' t want to wri te 
a prescr ipt ion because i t i s more dangerous (R. 142) . Erickson 
asked Paquette to wait a minute and l e f t her standing in the 
wait ing room (R. 142) . Paquette watched him through the bl inds 
go to defendant motorcycle parked in front of the o f f i c e and take 
something out of the saddlebag portion of defendant motorcycle 
(R. 142 , 258, 283 ) . When he returned to her he had a small 
prescr ipt ion bo t t l e containing amphetamines which he sold to her 
for s i x t y d o l l a r s cash (R. 142, 257, 258) . 
Both Off icers Huggard and Mayo, who were s i t t i n g in a 
car in front of the o f f i c e , a l so observed Erickson e x i t the 
dental o f f i c e , walk to the defendant motorcycle parked 
immediately in front of the dental o f f i c e , go to the back of 
defendant motorcycle, open the saddlebag compartment, take a 
package or small item out of i t , c lo se the compartment, and then 
walk back ins ide the dental o f f i c e where the sa l e of drugs took 
place (R. 192, 194, 207, 208-09, 215-16, 239-41) . They a l so 
watched Erickson leave the o f f i c e , lock the door and leave on 
defendant motorcycle 
(R. 198, 241) . 
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The evidence demonstrated that defendant 1983 silver 
Honda motorcycle was used or intended for use, to transport, or 
in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession or concealment of controlled substances and is legally 
sufficient to support the judgment of forfeiture. Section 58-37-
li# The trier of fact, the court, could have reasonably 
concluded that Erickson used defendant motorcycle to use, 
conceal, transport or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of 
controlled substances in violation of Utah Code Ann., Title 58, 
Chapter 37, the Utah Controlled Substances Act. The trier of 
fact could have reasonably found that on May 24, 1985, Paquette 
purchased contraband from Erickson, that he took contraband 
amphetamines from defendant motorcycle, and that defendant 
motorcycle facilitated the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession or concealment of the contraband amphetamines. 
It is apparent that the court did not accept Erickson1s 
proffer of testimony that he did not go to his motorcycle while 
talking with Paquette and that no contraband was kept in 
defendant motorcycle (R. 324). The trial court is under no 
obligation to accept the version of the facts advanced by 
defendant's witness, and may disregard them in whole or in part. 
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986). The trial judge, 
acting as trier of fact, is authorized to determine the 
credibility of the witness and to believe or disbelieve any 
witness. State v. Carlson, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 958 (1982). The judge, as the trier of fact, is 
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not obl igated to accept as true a defendant's own vers ion of the 
evidence nor h i s s e l f - e x c u l p a t i n g statements as to h is conduct 
and i n t e n t i o n s . The judge i s e n t i t l e d to use h i s own judgment as 
to evidence. S ta te v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976) . 
Defendant motorcyle 's argument that there i s no 
evidence that Erickson put any contraband in or on defendant 
motorcycle and no evidence that he transported any contraband i s 
unsupported by the fac t s (Appellant's brief p. 7 ) . Paquette, 
Huggard and Mayo each t e s t i f i e d that they saw Erickson go t o 
defendant motorcycle on May 24, open a s u i t c a s e - l i k e compartment 
or saddlebag, take a package or some small item out of i t , c lo se 
the compartment, and then return to the o f f i c e (R. 142, 193, 194, 
207, 208-09, 215-216, 239-241, 258, 283) . Paquette t e s t i f i e d 
that when Erickson returned he had a small prescr ipt ion bo t t l e 
containing capsules and t a b l e t s which were l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d as 
drugs (R. 142, 258) . Clearly , t h i s testimony e s t a b l i s h e d a nexus 
between the contraband and defendant motorcycle. I t i s not 
s i g n i f i c a n t that no photograph was taken of Erickson when he went 
to the motorcycle. Officer Mayo t e s t i f i e d that no photograph was 
taken when Erickson went to defendant motorcycle because Erickson 
was "too c lose to the camera" and Mayo was concerned that 
Erickson could or would see him photographing the events (R. 127-
2 8 ) . 
Defendant motorcycle s t a t e s that the "evidence does not 
r i s e t o the d igni ty of a v i o l a t i o n " (Appellant's brief p. 6 ) , but 
provides no l ega l ana lys i s in support thereof and therefore t h i s 
Court should dec l ine to rule on i t . S ta te v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
- 1 0 -
1341 (Utah 1984). Defendant motorcycle r e l i e s on UyS. v, One 
1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D. N. H. 1974). In the Datsun case 
i t was an undisputed fact tha t the contraband was never 
transported by or concealed in the veh ic le . 378 F. Supp. at 
1202. The court determined tha t since the vehicle had not been 
used to carry or t ransport contraband, that no negot ia t ions for 
the purchase were carr ied on in the car, and no part of the sale 
was transacted in the car, the automobile was not subject to 
fo r fe i tu re . In the present case there i s evidence tha t 
contraband had been concealed or t ransported in the defendant 
motorcycle, and therefore the Datsun case analysis i s 
inappl icable . For the same reasons the ana lys is and holding in 
U.S. v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985) 
and U.S. v. One 1974 Cadil lac Eldorado Vin, 575 F.2d 344 (2nd 
Cir. 1978) are not con t ro l l ing . 
Further, defendant motorcycle s t a t e s in the Summary of 
Argument tha t the judgment of fo r fe i tu re i s unduly harsh and 
extreme punishment (Appellant 's brief p. 5 ) , however defendant 
motorcycle provides no legal ana lys is in support thereof and 
based upon Sta te v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984), t h i s 
Court should decline to rule on i t . 
Erickson, owner of defendant motorcycle, was convicted 
of three counts of unlawful d i s t r i bu t i on for value of a 
control led substance, a second degree felony, S 58-37-
8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i i ) . S ta te v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 757 (Utah 1986). Facts 
demonstrate tha t on May 24 Erickson sold Paquette amphetamines 
for $60 in cash and tha t the contraband had been obtained from 
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defendant motorcycle (R. 142, 143 , 193, 194, 207, 208-209, 215-
216, 239-241, 257, 258, 283) . I t was undisputed that the 
estimated value of defendant motorcycle was $8,200 (R. 328) . 
The amount of contraband drugs has no bearing on a 
f o r f e i t u r e pursuant to § 58 -37 -13 (1 ) , which provides as f o l l o w s : 
(1) The fol lowing shal l be subject to f o r f e i t u r e 
and no property right sha l l e x i s t in them: 
(a) All contro l led substances which have 
been manufactured, d i s t r ibuted , dispensed, 
or acquired in v i o l a t i o n of t h i s a c t ; 
(b) All raw mater ia l s , products, and 
equipment of any kind used, or intended 
for use, in manufacturing, compounding, 
process ing, d e l i v e r i n g , importing, or 
exporting any contro l led substance in 
v i o l a t i o n of t h i s a c t ; 
(c) All property used or intended for 
use as a container for property described 
in Subsect ions (1)(a) and (1)(b) of t h i s 
s e c t i o n ; 
(d) All hypodermic need le s , syr inges and 
other paraphernalia, not to include 
capsules used with health food supplements 
and herbs, used or intended for use to 
administer control led substances in 
v i o l a t i o n of t h i s a c t ; 
(e) All conveyances including a i r c r a f t , 
v e h i c l e s or v e s s e l s used or intended 
for use , to transport , or concealment of 
property described in (1) (a) or (1)(b) of 
t h i s s e c t i o n , except t h a t : 
( i ) No conveyance used by any person 
as a common carrier in the transact ion of 
business as a common carrier shal l be 
f o r f e i t e d under t h i s s ec t i on unless i t 
appears that the owner or other person 
in charge of the conveyance was a 
consenting party or privy to v i o l a t i o n 
of t h i s a c t ; and 
( i i ) No conveyance shal l be f o r f e i t e d 
under t h i s s ec t i on by reason of any act or 
omission e s tab l i shed by the owner to have 
been committed or omitted without h i s 
knowledge or consent; and 
( i i i ) Any f o r f e i t u r e of a conveyance 
subject to a bona f ide secur i ty i n t e r e s t 
sha l l be subject to the i n t e r e s t of the 
secured party upon the party ' s showing he 
could not have known in the exerc i s e of 
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reasonable dil igence that a v io la t ion would 
take place in the use of the conveyance. 
(f) All booksr records, and research, 
including formulas, microfilm, tapes , and 
data used or intended for use, in v io la t ion 
of t h i s ac t . 
(g) Everything of value furnished or intended 
to be furnished in exchange for a control led 
substance in v io la t ion of t h i s a c t , a l l 
proceeds t raceable to such an exchange, and 
a l l moneys, negotiable instruments, and 
s ecu r i t i e s used or intended to be used to 
f a c i l i t a t e any v io la t ion of t h i s a c t ; however, 
no property shall be for fe i ted under t h i s 
subsection, to the extent of the i n t e r e s t of 
the owner, by reason of any act or omission 
establ ished by him to have been committed, or 
omitted without his knowledge or consent. 
There i s a rebut table presumption tha t a l l 
money, coins, and currency found in close 
proximity to fo r fe i t ab le control led substances, 
drug manufacturing or d i s t r i bu t ing paraphernalia, 
or to fo r fe i t ab le records of the importation, 
manufacture, or d i s t r i bu t ion of control led 
substances are fo r fe i t ab le under t h i s sect ion. 
.The burden of proof shall be upon claimants 
of the property to rebut t h i s presumption. 
(h) All imitat ion control led substances as 
defined in the Imitat ion Controlled Substances 
Act. 
Two Utah cases dealing with vehicle fo r fe i tu re are 
Sta te v. One Porsche 2-Door, 526 P.2d 917 (Utah 1974) and Sta te 
v. One 1983 Pont iac , 717 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1986), which overrules 
in part S ta te v. One Porsche 2-Door. In S ta te v. One Porsche 2-
Door, t h i s Court was concerned not with the quant i ty of drugs, 
but rather tha t the owner-operator of the vehic le was only 
charged with a Class B misdemeanor and tha t the fine for the 
offense did not compare with the enormity of a $10,000 vehicle 
value. 526 P.2d a t 918 and 921. This Court in S ta te v. One 1983 
Pontiac s t a t ed : 
We affirm tha t the major thrus t 
of the s t a t u t e i s to s t r i k e a t those 
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involved in the trafficking of drugs, 
rather than at the individual whose 
possession is solely for his own 
consumption. However, we do not read 
section, 5 8r 37-1_3_ to r egui re a showing 
of a profit motive on the part of the 
per son involved in the transportation 
and distribution of drugs.; to the extent 
One Porsche is contrary it is overruled. 
The intent of the legislature in enacting 
section 58-37-13 was to discourage the 
manufacture, transportation, and 
distribution of illegal drugs in this 
state by allowing the forfeiture of 
any equipment, container, vehicle, or 
vessel used to facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment 
of contraband* This intent is clearly 
manifest from the language of the statute. 
When the language of the statute is plain 
and its meaning clear, there is no occasion 
to search for meaning beyond the statute 
itself. In re Stevens Estate, 102 Utah 
255, 130 P.2d 85 (1942). The district judge 
in his memorandum decision conceded that 
the vehicle was used to transport drugs 
on two occasions# and that the drugs were 
then sold to undercover officers. These 
actions are clearly within the language 
and intent of the statute which allows 
the forfeiture of the vehicle. The 
consideration of the lack of profit motive 
was not warranted by the statute and was 
an improper basis for denial of the petition. 
As for the small amount of drugs involved, 
*[t]he courts have uniformly held that a 
vehicle is subject to forfeiture no matter 
how small the quantity of contraband found." 
(Emphasis added.) 
717 P.2d at 1340 (citations omitted). In the present case 
Erickson was charged and convicted of three counts of a second 
degree felony. 
The Utah forfeiture statute does not contain any 
language requiring a certain quantity of drugs before forfeiture, 
nor does the statute contain any language that the charge roust be 
a felony before forfeiture becomes appropriate. The amount of 
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drugs t ranspor ted, possessed or involved i s i r r e l evan t . See 
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht. 416 U.S. 663, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 
(1974); U.S. v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (1978); U.S. 
v. One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck, 558 F.2d 755 (1977); and U.S. v. 
One (1) 1982 28' In ternat ional Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319 (1984). 
This Court in S ta te v. One 1983 Pontiac recognized "that a 
vehicle i s subject to fo r fe i tu re no matter how small the quant i ty 
of contraband found." 717 P.2d a t 1340 (c i t a t ions omitted). 
The Sta te respectful ly submits tha t under the Utah 
fo r fe i tu re s t a t u t e and relevant case law, the quant i ty of the 
contraband i s i r re levan t when i t comes to fo r f e i t u r e . Therefore, 
the t r i a l court properly disregarded the quant i ty of the drugs 
involved when determining if fo r fe i tu re was appropriate under the 
law. 
The value of the vehicle i s i r r e l evan t in a fo r fe i tu re 
proceeding pursuant to S 58-37-13. The s t a t u t e i s clear on i t s 
face tha t the Legis la ture intended fo r f e i tu re without 
consideration as to the value as compared to the value of the 
drugs. Section 58-37-13 makes no mention or reference to the 
value of the vehicle involved. The language i s clear and not 
ambiguous. The Legis la ture was not concerned with the value of 
the vehicle which i s subject to fo r f e i tu re . If the vehicle 
par t i c ipa ted in the t ranspor ta t ion , s a l e , or possession of a 
control led substance, the vehicle i s subject to fo r f e i t u r e . The 
analys is by t h i s Court in S ta te v. One 1983 Pontiac i s persuasive 
and applicable to the fac t s of the present case. 
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The facts before the lower court not only indicate the 
possession of contraband, but also the transportation and 
trafficking of amphetamines with the intent to distribute and the 
actual sale of the same for value. 
The State respectfully submits that § 58-37-13 is clear 
on its face and that the lower court properly disregarded the 
value of the defendant motorcycle in considering whether 
forfeiture was proper. 
Without legal analysis or reference to the record 
defendant motorcycle states that "Dr. Erickson had no knowledge 
of any contraband in or on the motorcycle" (Appellant's brief p. 
7). Based upon State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) this 
Court should decline to rule on the argument. However, the facts 
demonstrate that Erickson, the owner of defendant motorcycle, not 
only knew or should have known that the contraband was concealed 
on defendant motorcycle, but was in fact the one who committed 
the illegal acts. Therefore, the suggestion that he lacked 
knowledge is not only without merit, but frivolous. Erickson was 
convicted of three counts of unlawful distribution for value of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony. State v. Erickson, 
722 P.2d 757 (Utah 1986). The facts demonstrated that on May 24 
Erickson sold Paquette contraband and that he had obtained the 
contraband from defendant motorcycle (R. 142, 143, 193, 194, 207, ^  
208-209, 215-216, 239-241, 257, 258, 283). In citing § 58-37-
13(e) (ii) defendant motorcycle is apparently claiming an 
exception for Erickson thereunder. Section 58-37-13 (e)(ii) 
provides: 
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(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under 
this section by reason of any act or omission 
established by the owner to have been committed 
or omitted without his knowledge or consent; and 
It is clear that the exceptions from forfeiture under the statute 
are to protect the interest of innocent others in the vehicle. 
The facts in the present case do not give rise to an exception 
under S 58-37-13 (e)(ii). Erickson is not an innocent other who 
is in need of protection. Therefore, the forfeiture was proper. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN FORFEITING THE 
MOTORCYCLE AND DENYING MOTIONS 
TO SUPPRESS AND DISMISS. 
In argument heading II defendant motorcycle argues "the 
trial court erred and abused its discretion (1) in failing to 
follow the forfeiture standards prescribed in the cases in the 
record (R. 21 and R. 72E-72F), (2) in denying defendant's motions 
to suppress and dismissf and (3) in forfeiting the motorcycle", 
however provides no legal analysis and based upon State v. 
Ami cone. 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984), this Court should decline to 
rule on the arguments. 
It appears that defendant motorcycle is arguing that it 
was error for the trial court to deny its motion to dismiss the 
complaint and quash the notice of seizure and intent to forfeit. 
However, defendant motorcycle fails to demonstrate in what ways 
the court erred and abused its discretion. If defendant 
motorcycle is attempting to collaterally challenge the seizure of 
contraband at the time of or subsequent to the arrest of 
Erickson, then that is outside and beyond the scope of the 
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matters before t h i s Court. Erickson's convic t ions have been 
affirmed on appeal. S ta te v. Erickson. 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 1986). 
The t r i a l court did not abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n in 
f o r f e i t i n g defendant motorcycle and in denying motions to 
suppress and dismiss . 
In drafting § 58-37-13 , the Leg is la ture included 
certa in exemptions from f o r f e i t u r e . The exemptions in the 
f o r f e i t u r e sec t ion are found in § 5 8 - 3 7 - 1 3 ( 1 ) ( e ) ( i ) through 
( i i i ) , which provide as f o l l o w s : 
(1) The fol lowing sha l l be subject to 
f o r f e i t u r e and no property right shal l e x i s t 
in them: 
(e) All conveyances including 
a i r c r a f t , v e h i c l e s or v e s s e l s or v e s s e l s 
used or intended for use, to transport , 
or in any manner f a c i l i t a t e the transportat ion , 
s a l e , r e c e i p t , possess ion , or concealment 
of property described in (1) (a) or (1) (b) of 
t h i s s e c t i o n , except t h a t : 
( i ) No conveyance used by any person 
as common carrier in the transact ion of 
business as a common carrier shal l be f o r f e i t e d 
under t h i s s ec t ion unless i t appears that the 
owner or other person in charge of the conveyance 
was a consenting party or privy to v i o l a t i o n of 
t h i s a c t ; and 
( i i ) No conveyance shal l be f o r f e i t e d 
under t h i s sec t ion by reason of any act or 
omission e s tab l i shed by the owner to have been 
committed or omitted without h is knowledge or 
consent; and 
( i i i ) Any f o r f e i t u r e of a conveyance 
subject to a bona f ide secur i ty i n t e r e s t shal l 
be subject to the i n t e r e s t of the secured party 
upon the party 1 s showing he could not have known 
in the exerc i se of reasonable d i l i gence that a 
v i o l a t i o n would take place in the use of the 
conveyance. 
The Leg is la ture has not included except ions for 
quanti ty of the contro l l ed substance transported, the value of 
the contro l led substance in comparison with the value of the 
v e h i c l e , nor the value of the v e h i c l e to be f o r f e i t e d . 
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In the case of State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1975), t h i s Court held that 
if d i s cre t ion i s reasonably used, and 
i s not shown to have been abused, arbitrary, 
or capr ic ious , the judgment of the t r i a l 
court should not be disturbed. 
The f a c t s and the appl icable s ta tu te in the present 
case c l ear ly indicate that defendant motorcycle should be 
f o r f e i t e d and the judgment of f o r f e i t u r e affirmed. If the t r i a l 
court were to take upon i t s e l f to add except ions to a s ta tu te 
that i s c lear on i t s face , as i s requested by appel lant , then the 
court would be act ing in an arbitrary and capric ious manner. 
However, the t r i a l court acted reasonably and within i t s proper 
d i s c r e t i o n , therefore i t s judgment should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
The language of S 58-37-13 i s pla in and i t s meaning i s 
c l ear . This Court in In re Stevens Es ta te , 130 P.2d 85, 86-87 
(Utah 1942) held: 
This court w i l l not read in to t h i s 
s ta tute by j u d i c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n the 
words "or has some i n t e r e s t , d irect 
or i n d i r e c t . " The language of the 
s t a t u t e i s plain and i t s meaning i s 
c l e a r , in which case there i s no 
occasion to search for i t s meaning 
beyond the s t a t u t e i t s e l f . 
J u r i s d i c t i o n s with f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e s s imilar to 
Utah1s have held that under s imilar fact s i t u a t i o n s the veh ic l e 
should have been f o r f e i t e d . Only a small number of s t a t e s allow 
f o r f e i t u r e for mere possess ion . See Matter of 1972 Chevrolet 
Monte Carlo, 573 P.2d 535 (Arizona 1977) , State v. One Certain 
Conveyance, 211 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 1973) and State v. One 1970 2 -
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Poor Sedan Rambler (Gremlin), 215 N.W. 2d 84 9 (Neb. 1974) . 
Vir tua l ly a l l s t a t e s , however, allow f o r f e i t u r e for d i s t r i b u t i o n 
when the act r e s u l t s in a felony charge and/or a poss ib l e f ine of 
up to $5 ,000.00. 
In the matter of One 1965 Ford Econoline Van v. S t a t e , 
591 P.2d 569 at 572 (Arizona 1979) the Arizona Supreme Court 
c i t e d One Porsche 2-Door, supra, at 919, and that the Utah 
Supreme Court intended that the f o r f e i t u r e s ta tu te did not apply 
to possess ion , but was "directed e x c l u s i v e l y toward the 
transportat ion of a contro l led substance for d i s t r i b u t i o n 
according to ers twhi le law merchant p r i n c i p l e s , and not for 
personal possess ion and consumption." The f a c t s before the Court 
c l e a r l y indicate d i s t r i b u t i o n for value , and c l e a r l y f a l l within 
the l e g i s l a t i v e in tent of § 58-37-13. 
In l i g h t of the foregoing, i t was c l e a r l y within the 
t r i a l court ' s d i s c r e t i o n in i t s in terpre ta t ion of the f a c t s and 
how the f a c t s should apply to § 58-37-13 and order f o r f e i t u r e . 
Apparently defendant motorcycle argues the t r i a l court 
erred in denying i t s motions to suppress and d ismiss . However, 
the argument i s without merit . 
The Sta te agrees with the notion that the exclusionary 
rule might apply in cases of f o r f e i t u r e but denies there was any 
i l l e g a l search which would t r igger such an exc lus ion in the case 
before the Court. When Erickson obtained the contro l l ed 
substances from defendant motorcycle to s e l l them to Paquette, he 
did so in a parking l o t open to the public view (R. 142, 143, 
193, 194, 207, 208-209, 215-216, 239-241, 257, 258, 283) . He 
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later admitted after two Miranda warnings that he had made such a 
sale (R. 221-222, 223f 226). 
Apparently defendant motorcycle argues that a warrant 
was necessary before the officers could seize defendant 
motorcycle. Such assertion ignores the express language of the 
forfeiture statute which allows seizure without a warrant under 
58-37-13(2). 
However seizure without process may be made when: 
(a) The seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant or an inspection under 
an administrative inspection warrant; . . . 
(d) The peace officer has probable cause to 
believe that the property has been used or intended 
to be used in violation of this act. 
Section 58-37-13(2). 
The seizure was made incident to the arrest of Erickson 
on the 3rd day of June, 1985 (R. 183, 231). If the officers had 
left the defendant motorcycle at Erickson1s office while taking 
Erickson into custody, defendant motorcycle may have been damaged 
or removed by someone. The seizure was also based upon probable 
cause. The officer seizing defendant motorcycle had seen 
Erickson remove controlled substances from defendant motorcycle 
for sale to an undercover officer on the 24th day of May, 1985, 
and had listened to a conversation wherein Erickson agreed to 
sell controlled substances to an undercover officer (R. 231). 
The recording of Erickson1s conversation with the 
undercover officer is not subject to exclusion as is clearly 
pointed out in State v. Boone, 581 P.2d 571 (Utah 1978), where 
the Court stated, 
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As to the invasion of privacy, the defendant 
says the undercover agent who purchased the drug 
had an electronic broadcasting instrument attached 
to his body which emitted voice sounds, and some 
police officers working with the agent overheard 
the conversation by and between the defendant 
and agent. He also says that his right to privacy 
is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and by Article 
One, section fourteen of the Utah Constitution. 
Any rights which he might have under the Fourth 
Amendment would be against any encroachments by 
the federal authorities; however, the provisions 
of our state constitution (above cited) afford 
him the same protection against state intrusions* 
In either case there is no violation. 
In fact, a majority of the members of the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in the case of U.S. v. White, that police 
eavesdropping on a conversation between an accused and an 
informant by means of a radio transmitter concealed on the person 
of the informant does not violate the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 92 S.Ct. 1122 (1971). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
forfeiting the defendant motorcycle and in denying motions to 
suppress and dismiss. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of forfeiture 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / day of December, 
1966. 
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